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ABSTRACT
The paper seeks to understand the impact of the patent system on innovation by examining shifts
in the strength of patent protection across sixty countries and a 150-year period. An examination of 177
policy changes reveals that strengthening patent protection appears to have few positive effects on patent
applications by entities in the country undertaking the policy change, whether filings in Great Britain or
the nation making the policy change are considered. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the impact of
patent protection-enhancing shifts were greater in nations with weaker initial protection and greater
economic development, consistent with economic theory. I address concerns about the endogeneity of
these changes by employing an instrumental variable approach.
Josh Lerner
Morgan Hall





jlerner@hbs.edu1.  Introduction 
The impact of intellectual property rights on innovation is one of the most 
persistent empirical questions in the economics of technological change.  In a memorable 
formulation, Penrose [1951] noted: 
If national patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make a 
conclusive case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist shifts 
the burden of proof and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive 
case for abolishing them. 
 
Nearly five decades later, a literature review by Mazzoleni and Nelson [1998] reached a 
similar conclusion, “our lack of knowledge here clearly limits our ability to analyze 
intelligently the current pressing issues of patent reform.”  
 
This paper addresses this question by examining the impact of major patent policy 
shifts in sixty nations over the past 150 years that enhanced the amount of patent 
protection provided (but not the scope of awards).  I examine the changes in patent 
applications by residents of the nation undertaking the policy change.  While I tabulate 
the filings that the residents made domestically, confounding factors may influence this 
measure.  Thus, I focus on filings made by residents of the nation undertaking the policy 
change in a nation with a relatively constant patent policy, Great Britain.  As a control, I 
also compute the changes of filings by foreign entities in the country undertaking the 
policy change.  The policy shifts and their impact on patenting activity are determined 
from examinations of numerous guides to patenting activity, as well as the publications of 
the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) and the various national patent offices. 
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The basic patterns are striking.  Consider, for instance, policy changes that 
strengthen patent protection.  Once overall trends in patenting are adjusted for, the 
changes in patenting by residents of the country undertaking the policy change are 
negative, both in Great Britain and in the country itself.  Subject to the caveats noted in 
the conclusion, this evidence suggests that these policy changes did not spur innovation. 
 
The extensive theoretical literature on patenting suggests at least three predictions 
about when strengthening patent policy should particularly boost innovation.  To explore 
these suggestions, I examine cross-sectional differences across these events.  Consistent 
with theoretical suggestions, I find that patent protection-enhancing shifts have a lesser 
impact on innovation when the nation already has strong patent protection and when its 
per capita gross domestic product lags further behind other nations.  These patterns 
continue to hold when I employ an instrumental variables approach, which partially 
addresses the concern that the timing of these policy changes is not exogenous. 
 
This paper takes a considerably different tack than earlier works on this question, 
which have largely focused on understanding the impacts of a single patent policy 
reform.  Examples include studies of the broadening of Japanese patent scope 
(Sakakibara and Branstetter [2001]), the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in the United States (Kortum and Lerner [1998], Hall and Ziedonis 
[2001]), and the strengthening of patent protection of pharmaceuticals in such nations as 
India (Lanjouw [1998]) and Italy (Scherer and Weisburst [1995]).  These papers 
generally cast doubt on claims that enhancing patent policy changes spurs innovative   3
behavior.  My results are largely consistent with the earlier work.  But by aggregating a 
large number of episodes, I am able to reduce the problem of confounding effects that 
individual case studies often face. 
 
This paper is also related to works in the international trade literature, which have 
sought to relate indexes of intellectual property protection (such as those developed by 
Ginarte and Park [1997] and Rapp and Rozek [1990]) to the volume of trade or foreign 
direct investment.  (This literature is reviewed in Maskus [2000].)  Reflecting the nature 
of these indexes, these papers have typically examined these relationships at a single 
point in time or over a very short time period.  As a result, these analyses have found it 
challenging to disentangle the causal relationships: e.g., the possibility that countries 
could have greater intellectual property protection because they engage in more 
international trade, not vice versa.   
 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  The second section reviews the theoretical 
work that motivates the analysis.  I discuss the construction of the data set in Section 3.  
Section 4 presents the analysis.  The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical  Perspectives 
In this section, I discuss theoretical predictions concerning the impact of enhanced 
patent protection on innovation and the implications for my analysis. 
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A.  Impact of Enhanced Patent Protection 
Much of the theoretical economics literature has assumed an unambiguous 
relationship between the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation.  To cite 
a few examples, in Gilbert and Shapiro [1990], Kamien and Schwartz [1974], Klemperer 
[1990], and Waterson [1990], an increase in the amount of patent protection offered 
unambiguously increases the rate of innovation.  A crucial assumption behind such 
findings is that the nature of the patent award does not affect the incentives of subsequent 
researchers to pursue innovations.
1   
 
This assumption has been relaxed in a line of work on sequential innovation, 
beginning with Scotchmer and Green [1990].  When the nature of protection offered the 
initial innovator affects the incentives of subsequent researchers, the conclusions may 
change.  The effects of such an adjustment are perhaps most starkly illustrated by Bessen 
and Maskin [2000], who assume that a firm must be actively competing in the product 
market in order to introduce a next generation product.  In this case, a strong patent award 
has the effect of precluding other firms from pursuing a subsequent innovation.  They 
suggest that strong patent protection may actually lead to significantly less innovation 
than no patent protection at all.
2 
                                                           
1Williams [1994] suggests that while an increase in patent protection may spur 
innovation, its effect may be very modest.  His simulations suggest that a 10% increase in 
patent life will boost productivity by less than one-tenth of one percent.  
  
2In addition to the theoretical rationales suggested above, there could be several other 
reasons why enhanced patent protection could lead to a (temporary) decline in patenting.  
One possibility is a “crowding out” effect.  Case studies suggest, for instance, that foreign 
pharmaceutical companies aggressively expanded their operations in countries that 
enhanced pharmaceutical patent protection.  In some of these cases, the new entrants 
hired many local researchers away from basic research positions with local firms.  Often,   5
 
B.  The Relative Effect of Patent Policy Shifts 
Theorists have also focused on the question of when strong patent protection is 
likely to have a powerful effect on innovation.  Researchers have examined the impact of 
differences along two dimensions: the strength of the patent protection in the nation and 
the technological standing of the nation relative to other countries. 
 
The strength of existing patent protection in the nation.  Gallini [1992] considers 
the impact of increasing patent life when rivals can “invent around” previous discoveries 
(at some cost).  When patent awards are short, her model predicts that increasing the 
length of a patent award will lead to innovators enjoying increased rewards, and hence to 
them having a greater incentive to innovate: stronger patents will lead to more 
innovation.  But above a certain threshold, increasing patent length leads rivals to seek to 
imitate the patent.  The losses from the increased imitation may more than offset the 
gains from the longer patent protection: when patents are already strong, increasing 
patent length further may actually depress the level of innovation.  This insight is refined 
in a series of subsequent models, such as Cadot and Lippman [1995] and Horwitz and Lai 
[1996].  These models similarly suggest that the relationship between patent length and 
innovation will display an “inverted U” shape. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the foreign companies used the scientists for more applied roles (e.g., obtaining local 
regulatory approval for already-developed drugs).  Since in many cases the local 
companies found it hard to replace these individuals, fewer domestic patents may have 
resulted.  Alternatively, local companies may have initiated basic research programs after 
the policy change, but these may have taken many years to generate any patent filings.  
    6
The stage of the nation’s development.  Much of the economics research into the 
determinants of the optimal degree of patent protection has focused on the nation’s stage 
of development.  Initial analyses focused on a single-country setting.  In the classic model 
of Nordhaus [1969], a policy-maker considered how to encourage an incremental (cost 
saving) innovation.  The greater the degree of patent protection, he assumed, the greater 
the resources that a private firm will devote to pursuing the innovation and the greater the 
probability of a discovery (though the probability increases at a declining rate with the 
amount spent on R&D).  The analysis suggests that the impact of changes in patent 
protection on innovation will be determined by the curvature of the R&D cost function, 
which may be interpreted as the ease of further discovery for a given additional 
expenditure.  In settings where relatively modest investments are likely to lead to 
substantial discoveries but progress beyond a certain point is much more costly—which 
Nordhaus suggests will characterize nations who are technological followers—increased 
patent protection will have a limited impact on the pace of innovation.   
 
This insight has been corroborated in subsequent models that depict a world with 
both a developed and developing nation.  A number of papers (e.g., Chin and Grossman 
[1990], Deardorff [1992], and Helpman [1993]) suggest that mechanistically transferring 
the intellectual property practices in place in the developed world to developing countries 
is problematic.  These works suggest that the spur to domestic innovation will be modest 
in these settings.
3 
                                                           
3Diwan and Rodrik [1991], however, show that if the developing country has a need for 
innovations that differ from that of the developed nation, strong intellectual property 
protection may be desirable.  Otherwise, it may not be able to induce the developed 
nation to undertake innovations in this area.   7
 
C.  The Mapping Between Theory and Empirical Tests 
These works discussed above focus on innovations by domestic entities.  One way 
to test these models is to examine patenting by residents of a large number of nations 
making patent policy shifts.  Patent applications by domestic residents can be examined 
both in the nation undertaking the policy change and in a nation with a relatively stable 
patent policy over this period. 
 
The mapping between what I seek to measure (innovative activity) and the 
dependent variable in this analysis (patent applications) is, of course, not exact.  It has 
long been recognized (see the discussion, for instance, Griliches [1990]) that many 
important innovations are not patented, while some patents are awarded for very modest 
discoveries.  While it would have been desirable to assess the importance of the patents 
through the analysis of patent citation and renewal data, this information was not 
available for most countries and time periods.   
 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that what I will be analyzing here is not the 
absolute level of patenting, but rather the changes in patenting associated with policy 
shifts.  As long as the propensity to patent does not change, this measure will be a 
reasonable proxy for the shifting level of innovative activities.  I also address this 
problem by examining not just patent applications filed by domestic entities in the 
country undergoing the policy change, but also activity in another country where patent 
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policy has been relatively constant.  To control for patenting trends, I adjust patent counts 
by the overall growth in patenting. 
 
It is also important to emphasize the fact that while I examine several types of 
policy changes that enhance patent holder rights, I do not include changes that altered the 
scope of patent protection.  If shifts that broadened patent scope were included, the 
interpretation of the dependent variable would be problematic: for instance, did patent 
applications fall because a decline in the amount of innovation, or rather because single 
patent filings now encompassed discoveries that previously had to be protected through 
multiple filings? 
 
The models discussed above generally do not discuss patenting by foreign 
entities.  (Scotchmer [2001] is an important exception.)  The impact of such a policy shift 
on foreign entities is likely to be very different.  For a typical foreign entity, which is 
likely to sell only a small fraction of its products in the country making the policy 
change, the impact of the policy shift on the decision to pursue an innovation will be 
much smaller.  But the patent policy shift may nonetheless influence the decision to 
pursue patent protection in that country.  Even though an enhancement of patent 
protection is not likely to shift foreign firms’ level of innovation, after such a policy 
change the companies may become much more likely to seek patent protection in that 
country for their inventions.  If we see a shift in foreign patent filings around the same 
events, it helps reassure us that we have properly identified a set of significant policy 
changes.   9
 
3.  Constructing the Data Set 
 
In this section, I describe the process by which the data set was created.  Because 
of the diversity of sources employed (a number of which have not been previously 
employed in economic research), I discuss this aspect of the research at some length. 
 
A.  Defining the Sample 
I employed as my sample the sixty countries listed in the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics [1999] with the highest total gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1997.
4  This included many nations that experienced considerable 
economic growth, but also others (e.g., Argentina, Iraq) that underwent substantial 
reversals. 
 
I included these nations in the sample back until 1850 or until the country ceased 
to be an independent political entity, whichever came later.  My rationale for this 
approach was that most colonies did not have independent patent policies.  Most did not 
grant patents at all: they simply registered patents granted by their colonial overseer 
without any formal review.  If the colonies had patent systems, they usually closely 
mirrored those of their colonizers.  As a result of these omissions, this sample is not 
                                                           
4In undertaking these rankings, if the country was missing GDP data for 1997, I used the 
GDP and exchange rate for the most recent year for which such data were available 
(inflation-adjusting the result to insure comparability).  In one case (Iraq), the volume had 
no data for the past five years.  In this case, a consensus estimate from press accounts was 
used.  In the second case (Taiwan), a country was not listed owing to questions about its 
political status.  In this case, data were obtained from government publications. 
    10




B.  Identifying Patent Policy Changes 
I then identified significant changes to the amount of patent protection offered.  I 
determined this information using guidebooks to the world patent systems, which have 
been published frequently since the early nineteenth century.  I also employed 
publications of the British Patent Office (Commissioners of Patents’ Journal), the Patent 
Office Society (Journal of the Patent Office Society and related titles), the publisher 
Trade Activities (Patent and Trade Mark Review), and the WIPO (Industrial Property 
and La Propriete Industrielle), as well as legal monographs on individual nations’ patent 
systems in the collections of Harvard University and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law.  (The key data collected and 
sources employed are summarized at http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/PatPolSum.pdf.) 
  
Five principles guided my selection of events to include in the analysis.  First, I 
wished to focus on episodes where the government consciously set out to shift its patent 
policy.  I consequentially eliminated policy changes that occurred within five years of the 
establishment of a nation, its restoration after a period of being a part of another state, or 
                                                           
5Determining what constituted an independent country was not always a simple matter.  
In some cases, colonies underwent prolonged independence struggles, while in other 
cases, countries enjoyed a great deal of independence while under the official control or 
informal influence of another nation.  In general, I sought to include a nation from the 
date that its independence was declared (conditional on its eventually becoming a widely 
recognized country).  In cases where a country was divided into several political entities, 
I used the patent policy (and other characteristics discussed below) from the most 
economically significant portion.    11
a revolution that involved a change of the form of government.  I also excluded policy 
changes that were designated as temporary measures during a time of war.   
 
Second, I wanted to be sure that the events were precisely dated.  I thus 
eliminated changes where I could not determine the year of the policy shift.  For instance, 
some nations during the nineteenth century simply began issuing patents on chemicals, 
even though legislation remained on the books for many years thereafter indicating that 
these subjects were not patentable.   
 
Third, I eliminated changes to the breadth of patent protection.  In these cases, as 
noted above, the interpretation of one of my dependent variables (domestic patenting) 
would be problematic.   I thus did not include changes in statuary patent scope or in the 
number of claims that could be included in the patent. 
 
Fourth, I wanted to compare the reactions to the policy changes by domestic 
entities to those by foreign entities.  I thus eliminated policy changes that happened at the 
same time as discriminatory provisions against foreign applicants were either imposed or 
relaxed. 
 
Finally, I wanted to insure that the changes were substantive shifts in patent 
policy.  I consequentially only not included shifts in the most visible and controversial 
areas of patent policy.  These areas were as follows: 
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•  Whether the country offered patent protection at all, either in general or for 
certain critical classes of discoveries.  While by 1999, 59 out of the 60 largest 
countries had patent protection, during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries patent systems were far from universal.  Similarly, the decision to 
extend patent protection to chemicals, foodstuffs, and medicinals was highly 
controversial in many countries. 
 
•  The duration of the patents awarded to domestic applicants. Because in some 
cases, awards were measured from different starting points (e.g., application and 
award dates), I employed some assumptions in making these calculations.  In 
making the computations, for 1950 and afterwards, I assumed that awards 
occurred two years after the application date (one year after publication date).  
Between 1900 and 1949, I assumed awards occurred one year after the application 
date (and publication date).  Before 1900, I assumed awards occurred only a 
nominal period after application.  
 
•  The cost of the patent.  Many nations adjusted their costs on a periodic basis, 
often to keep up with inflation.  In order to insure that I just identified real policy 
shifts, I only included changes in the cost of patents if they entailed at least a 
100% increase or a 50% decrease in patent cost.
6  Because in many cases, 
countries required a series of fees over the patent life, I compared the net present 
value of the payments associated with the patent of the longest duration normally 
granted, discounted back to the date of the original patent application using the 
U.S. 10-year treasury yield (or an estimated yield of government bonds in earlier 
years), and expressed in 1998 U.S. dollars. 
 
•  The period of time after which patents could be revoked or compulsorily licensed 
if they were not reduced to practice (“worked”) in a set period.  Occasionally, 
when patentees could choose patents of different lengths, the minimum period in 
which the patent had to be worked differed.  I examined the working period for 
the patent of the longest duration normally granted. 
 
In total, I ended up with 177 events in 51 out of the 60 nations in the sample.  The first 
change in the sample occurred in 1852 and the last in 1998.  In many cases, the policy 
shift affected several elements of the patent system, or two closely related bills were 
                                                           
6In many cases, countries raised the price of a patent dramatically after a period of 
hyperinflation, but the change returned the real fee back to what it was before the 
inflationary episode.  These changes did not appear to be real policy shifts.  I eliminated 
changes that followed periods of hyper-inflation or deflation (i.e., cases where the 
currency depreciated by 100% against the dollar or depreciated by 50%) unless the new 
cost of the patent was less than half or more than double the cost before the period in real 
terms.   13
passed in the same year.  Consequentially, the number of distinct policy changes was 
larger, a total of 271. 
 
The number of events and distinct policy changes occurring in each decade are 
depicted in Figure 1.  Because the number of countries in the sample varies, I normalized 
the changes by the number of nations that were active at the beginning of the decade.  
The figure indicates that there have been five waves of patent policy changes, from the 
“Patent Controversy” of the 1850s and 1860s (Penrose [1951]) to the response to the 
changes triggered by the 1993 Uruguay Round agreements. 
 
C.  Identifying Patenting around the Policy Shifts 
The next phase was to determine the patent applications filed around the time of 
the policy changes.  I identified three distinct measures of activity: patent filings in Great 
Britain by residents of the country undertaking the policy change, patent applications by 
domestic entities in the country undertaking the policy change, and applications by 
foreign entities in that country.  I chose Great Britain because its patent office has 
consistently tabulated the national identity of the patent applicants since 1884 (except 
during the years of World War I) and the relative constancy of its patent policy.  In these 
tabulations, I sought to only include traditional patent awards, eliminating various weaker 
variants that nations have sometimes also offered to inventors.  These included design 
patents, inventors’ certificates, patents of addition, plant patents, and utility model 
patents. 
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I identified this information from a variety of sources.  The WIPO has tabulated 
these filings since 1962 in La Propriete Industrielle and (subsequently) Industrial 
Property, and Great Britain has reported filings in the Annual Report of the Comptroller 
General.  WIPO has also compiled older data in 100 Years Protection of Industrial 
Property  [1983].  Unfortunately, the WIPO data were in some cases inaccurate.  In 
particular, during the early years of the European Patent Office, filings through the 
central office were not always properly credited to the individual countries selected.  I 
corrected the data through an examination of the databases and publications of the 
European Patent Office and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.   
 
More problematic was the fact that the data were quite incomplete.  In many 
cases, the WIPO publications did not present any information on applications prior to 
1960, or failed to divide the applications between domestic and foreign filings.  (While a 
few other compilations exist, such as Federico [1964], they were largely based on WIPO 
data and had similar failings.)  Thus, I was forced to turn to publications of the various 
national patent offices to compile this information.  I found the volumes in the Science 
Reference Library (formerly the Patent Office Library) of the British Library.  This 
collection has had a policy of acquiring all patent office publications since its formation 
in the 1850s.  The publications that contained the necessary data were identified through 
Rimmer and van Dulken [1992] and consultations with the reference librarian. 
   15
The data in the national publications were sometimes inconsistent.  In some cases, 
the tabulations employed a different interval than the calendar year that I sought to use 
throughout.  In these cases, I used the reporting year that corresponded most closely to 
the calendar year of interest.  In other cases, certain other patent awards (e.g., utility 
model awards) were included in the total count of patent applications.  I used the data as 
long as additional awards did not appear to constitute more than 10% of the patent 
applications in the total.
7 
 
I sought to collect the data for “event window” from five years before to five 
years after the policy change.  In all, I was able to identify data on domestic and foreign 
patent filings in the country for 145 of the 177 event windows, and British application 
data for 171.  (In some cases, the information was insufficient to compute the changes 
from two years before the policy change to two years afterwards, as analyzed below.)  I 
also collected similar data for the “estimation period” from twenty to five years prior to 
the event.  
 
D.  Supplemental Data 
I also collected a variety of additional information about the countries at the time 
of the shifts.  This information was drawn from a wide variety of sources, but most 
                                                           
7In certain cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, nations (including the 
United States) reported the breakdown of the nationality of their patent awards, but just 
the number (not the breakdown) of applications.  In many instances, a large fraction of 
applications were accepted, making it possible to impute the breakdown of applications 
quite accurately.  In these cases, if the number of applications and awards (lagged one 
year) were within 25% of each other, I used the data at hand to impute the number of 
applications.  In particular, I assumed that the applications in a given year were divided 
proportionately to the awards in the subsequent year.   16
important were Banks [1999], International Monetary Fund [1999], Maddison [1995], 
and Mitchell [1998].  The variables employed in this analysis included: 
•  Population of the country. 
 
•  Per capita gross domestic product.  The variable was converted into current U.S. 
dollars using, if possible, a purchasing power parity-based deflator. It was then 
converted into 1998 dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator (back to 1889) or the U.S. 
consumer price index (for earlier years).  
 
•  The coincidence of the event window and a change in either the country’s national 
borders (representing either at least 10% of its surface area or population) or a war 
within the territory of the country (lasting at least three months and affecting at least 
10% of the nation’s territory).  These indicators were coded as +1 if there was a war 
in progress at the end of the period that was not present at the beginning or an 
expansion of territory.  They were coded as –1 if there was a war in progress at the 
beginning of the period and not at the end or a contraction of territory.
8 
 
I sought to match the dates of these measures as closely as possible to the patent 
policy change, typically using the same calendar year.  For the nineteenth century, 
however, I relaxed these requirements: I employed an observation as long as it was 
within five years of the patent policy change.  This was particularly true of the estimates 
of gross domestic product, which were frequently only periodically available. 
 
4.  Analysis of Patent Protection 
A. Summary  Statistics 
I began by simply summarizing the changing level of patent applications in the 
years before and after the policy shift.  Panel A of Table 1 reports the changes in patent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
     
8In unreported regressions, I also used some additional control variables.  These included 
the manner in which the effective ruler responsible for day-to-day governance of the 
country was selected (direct election, indirect election, or non-elective), whether the 
legislature was selected through an elective process, a ranking of the effectiveness of the 
legislative body, the mixture between agricultural, industrial, and services employment, 
and the legal family into which the nation’s commercial laws fell.   17
applications filed from two years before to two years after the policy shift.  In order to 
enhance the sample size, when the necessary observation was missing, I substituted data 
from either three years before or after the change or one year before or after. 
 
I divided the observations by the type of policy change.  Most shifts (64%) 
unambiguously increased patent protection.  The remainder either unambiguously 
reduced patent protection (24%) or else contained both protection-enhancing and 
detracting elements (12%).  In view of the small sample sizes, I treated the ambiguous 
and negative changes together in the reported analysis.  (In unreported univariate and 
regression analyses, I undertook the same analyses without the ambiguous cases.  The 
results were little changed.) 
 
Domestic and foreign patent applications both increased in countries undertaking 
patent protection-enhancing shifts.  The increase was larger, on both an absolute and 
percentage basis, among the foreign applicants.  (In the sample as a whole, the mean 
number of British, domestic, and foreign patent applications during the year of the policy 
change were 739, 13,296, and 14,118 respectively.)  No evidence appeared of a rise in 
British patent applications. 
 
Panel A does not, however, control for changes in the overall propensity to seek 
patent protection over the period.  In event studies of stock price returns, it is standard to 
present returns net of an appropriate market index.  I similarly sought to control for the 
changing global patenting trends.  Some periods, such as the depression years of the 
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1930s and the two world wars, saw a dramatic decline in patent applications across all 
nations, while others saw a substantial increase. 
 
To control for the changing patenting environment, I computed the “adjusted” 
difference: the difference in the number of patent applications filed in this interval, less 
the difference that would have been expected, had the applications grown at the same rate 
as in other countries.  To determine the growth rate in other countries, I constructed an 
index using the ten nations with the longest time series of patent application data.  These 
nations included some where patenting has grown dramatically (e.g., the United States) 
and others where it has not (for instance, Argentina).  In Panels B and C, I report the 
analysis using two indexes, one assigning an equal weight to each of the ten nations, and 
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where A+2 is the number of applications filed two years after the policy shift, A-2 is the 
number of applications filed two years before, I+2 is the level of the index two years after 
the policy change, and I-2 is the index two years before.
9 
 
                                                           
9It might be wondered why I did not examine the percentage change in the number of 
applications filed.  In some cases, countries had a very small number of applications 
before a policy change.  Even a modest rise in the number of filings thus led to a huge 
percentage jump in applications.  While the same patterns appear in the percentage 
tabulations, the presence of such extreme cases made the comparisons very noisy.  
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Once the adjustment for overall patent application growth was made, a stark 
difference appeared in the case of patent protection-enhancing changes.  While the 
change in foreign patenting was positive, adjusted patent applications by residents of the 
country undergoing the policy change declined, whether British or domestic filings were 
considered.  The response of foreign patenting was much more modest in magnitude in 
the case of protection-reducing and ambiguous changes.  The table also reports similar 
tabulations for the three most frequently encountered classes of changes: enhancements 
to the subject matter covered by patent protection (56% of 177 events involved such a 
change), the length of patent protection (50%), and the length of the working period 
(21%).   
 
I also report the statistical significance of these changes.  In the financial event 
study literature, a standard procedure for computing test statistics for event studies has 
emerged.  First, the standard deviation of returns during an estimation period, which does 
not overlap with the event window, is computed.  Each observation is then weighted by 
the inverse of the standard deviation when undertaking univariate or regression analyses 
(see Brown and Warner [1980]).  In this way, observations where the stock price is very 
volatile are assigned less weight.  In the same spirit, I computed the standard deviation of 
the change in patent applications filed in the period from twenty years to five years prior 
to the policy shift.  I weighted both the t-tests and the regression analyses by the inverse 
of the standard deviation.
10  Not only did the adjusted patenting by residents of the 
                                                           
10I undertook separate calculations when examining British, domestic, and foreign 
applications.  When I was unable to find data on patent applications in the estimation 
period, or if the nation did not extend patent protection during this period, I assigned the 
observation a weight equal to that of the median event.  Brown and Warner [1980] also   20
country undertaking the policy change not increase after patent protection-enhancing 
policy shifts, it actually fell by a significant amount.  Foreign applications, however, 
reacted positively to protection-enhancing changes, suggesting that we had properly 
identified a set of significant policy shifts.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 depict graphically the average changes in patent applications 
around protection-enhancing and other patent policy changes, net of the value-weighted 
index.  Around protection-enhancing changes, the same striking pattern appeared: patent 
application by foreign entities increased dramatically, while filings by domestic entities 
(whether in Great Britain or in the country undergoing the policy change) fell on an 
adjusted basis.
11  The pattern was much more muted in the case of the ambiguous or 
patent protection-reducing changes.  Domestic filings changed little and the growth of 
foreign patenting was much more modest. 
 
One concern with the above analysis was that it might be inappropriate to use the 
same index for each class of patent applications.  For instance, the propensity of 
applicants to file foreign patents may have grown much more quickly than the tendency 
                                                                                                                                                                             
suggest more complex ways to compute these weights, which correct for the cross-
sectional correlation of changes in the estimation period.  To introduce such refinements, 
I would have had to undertake much greater data collection on patenting outside the event 
windows.  In light of the time and expense of this effort, I did not pursue these 
suggestions. 
 
11The fact that these changes began in the years before the policy change may reflect lags 
in the policy process.  In many instances, changes were discussed for years before being 
implemented, and hence at least partially anticipated.  In a number of cases, in fact, there 
was a significant lag between the decision to change the policy and its actual 
implementation.   
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to file domestically.  In this case, the adjustment process may lead to the growth of 
domestic patenting being understated, and that of foreign patenting overstated.   
 
To address this concern, in an unreported analysis I explored the robustness of 
these patterns to the use of an alternative index based on just the same type of patenting.  
In other words, instead of using the index based on all applications in the ten countries to 
adjust the number of applications, I employed an index based on domestic filings in the 
ten nations to adjust the domestic filings, and so forth.  The change had a very modest 
impact on the analysis.  In some countries, such as the United States, the ratio of 
domestic to foreign filings fell sharply over the twentieth century.  But in others, such as 
Japan, this ratio rose considerably.  Thus, the effects of the change were small.  For 
instance, in the case of patent protection-enhancing changes, the differences in domestic 
and British patenting remained negative and the foreign patenting difference remained 
positive.  These shifts continued to be statistically significant, at least at the 10% 
confidence level.     
 
In other unreported analyses, I adjusted the composition of the countries in the 
indexes.  For instance, I was concerned that since many of the nations undertaking policy 
changes were developing ones, the index might be distorted by the presence of the most 
developed nations.  I recomputed the index, restricting it at all times to nations whose per 
capita  gross domestic product was below 75% of that of the wealthiest nation.  The 
results were little changed.   
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B. Regression  Analyses 
The univariate analysis discussed in the previous section suggested that patent 
applications originating in the nation undertaking a patent policy shift (whether filed in 
Great Britain or domestically) did not increase significantly in response to policy 
changes.  But the cross-sectional differences in the sample may nonetheless be of interest.   
 
The theoretical literature discussed in Section 2 offered a number of predictions 
about when strengthened patent policy should be most efficacious in spurring innovation.  
In particular, it suggested that protection-enhancing changes would have less impact 
when patent protection was already strong, would have more of an effect when protection 
was weak, and would be less effective when countries were far behind the technological 
frontier.  This section examines these suggestions. 
 
Following the finance event study literature, I estimated regressions in which the 
“adjusted” growth in patenting by residents of the country undertaking the policy change 
was the dependent variable.  (I considered both patenting in Great Britain and in the 
country undertaking the change.)  As independent variables, I employed a dummy 
variable denoting whether the policy represented a patent protection-enhancing change 
and one of three alternatives: a dummy denoting whether protection prior to the policy 
change was particularly strong, a dummy denoting whether protection was particularly 
weak, and the per capita GDP of the country relative to that of the wealthiest nation at 
that time. In the reported regressions, I used the length of patent protection to designate 
countries with particularly strong (those where patents extended eighteen or more years   23
from the application date) or weak (those where patent life was ten years from the 
application date or less) protection.  Of greatest interest was the interaction of the positive 
change measure with the three additional variables.  
 
I also employed a variety of control variables.  These included the type of policy 
change, the inception of a conflict on the territory of or a change in the boundaries of the 
nation during the event window, the number of patent applications filed two years before 
the policy change, and the population of the nation (in millions). I again weighted each 
observation by the inverse of the standard deviation of changes in patent applications 
during the estimation period. 
 
Table 2 examines patenting by the residents of the country undertaking the patent 
policy change in Great Britain.  The dummy variable indicating a patent protection-
enhancing policy shift was not significantly positive on a consistent basis.  But in two out 
of three cases, the interaction term took on the predicted sign and was significant at the 
5% confidence level.  In the first and second regressions, the interaction between the 
dummy variable denoting strong patent protection prior to the policy change and that 
denoting a protection-enhancing change was significantly negative.  In the fourth 
regression, the interaction between the relative GDP measure and a protection-enhancing 
change was significantly positive.  This suggests that enhancing patent protection was 
less effective when patent protection was already strong and in poorer countries.  For 
instance, in a country whose per capita GDP was three-quarters of the richest nation, a 
patent policy-enhancing change stimulated 636 additional British patent applications than   24
an ambiguous or negative change.  In a country whose per capita GDP was about one-
quarter of that of the richest nation, such a change generated no additional patents. 
 
The analysis of patent applications in the country undertaking the policy change, 
reported in Table 3, was disappointing.  The only significant variables were two control 
variables.  Policy changes in larger countries tended to lead to a greater growth in 
patenting, which was not surprising in light of the fact that most changes were patent 
protection-enhancing.  The size of the reaction declined with the number of the patent 
applications at the beginning of the event period, consistent with suggestions that there 
may be diminishing returns to patenting (Griliches [1990]).  Given the greater noisiness 
of this measure, however, the failure to discern significant patterns may not be that 
surprising. 
 
In supplemental unreported analyses, I explored the robustness of these results.  
The use of longer event windows made little difference, as did adding more detailed 
controls for the nature of the policy change, the employment mixture of the country, its 
political system, or its legal family.  I also explored the robustness of the results to 
employing an alternative definition of the initial strength or weakness of patent 
protection.  I used a measure based on the presence or absence of restrictive provisions on 
patent holder rights (e.g., compulsory licensing provisions, prior user rights, provisions 
allowing the government to revoke patents at its discretion, working periods of under 
three years).  Again, patent protection-enhancing changes had significantly less of an 
impact on patent applications filed in Britain from countries that already had strong   25
protection.  I also employed the alternative indexes discussed in the previous section to 
adjust the change in patent applications and estimated Heckman sample selection 
regressions, which controlled for the fact that data were missing for some policy changes.  
The results were little changed. 
 
 
C.  Addressing Concerns about Causality 
  One concern with the above analysis was that patent policy changes might not be 
exogenous.  For instance, a nation may enhance patent protection at times when its 
domestic industry is becoming particularly innovative.  While the same concern has not 
deterred academics from pursuing hundreds, if not thousands, of event studies using stock 
price data (see, for instance, the discussion in Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams [1990]), 
I can at least partially address this issue by exploiting the history of the patent policy. 
 
In order to address endogeneity problems, a standard approach is to identify an 
instrumental variable.  Such a variable ought to be positively correlated with the 
explanatory variable of interest, but not correlated with the potentially confounding 
factor.  I sought an instrument for the measure of whether the patent policy change was a 
positive one or not. 
 
I used as an instrument another dummy variable, which indicated whether the 
policy change took place in the aftermath of the Paris Convention of 1883 or the TRIPs 
agreement of 1993.
12  The rationale for the use of this instrument was that these 
                                                           
12I defined the aftermath as the years 1883 to 1893 and 1992 to 1998 (the end of the 
sample).  I included 1992, even though the agreement was signed in 1993, because a   26
agreements compelled nations to make protection-enhancing changes to their patent 
systems.  This measure had a strong positive correlation with the indicator of protection-
enhancing policy changes.  Fully 90% of the policy changes in these years were 
protection enhancing, as opposed to 57% in other periods, a difference significant at the 
one percent confidence level.  But because the impetus to adopt these changes was 
largely exogenous to the country, the endogeneity problem should be reduced.  (Of 
course, some nations, such as Ecuador in the 1885, chose to resign from the International 
Union rather than make the required changes, or did not join the Union in the first place.) 
 
Helping underscore the reasonableness of this instrument was that fact that the 
initial patent policies of many nations were quite diverse, and influenced by many factors 
other than economic considerations.  Case studies of patent policy make clear that many 
of the aspects of patent policy were determined by a wide array of actors with very 
narrow agendas in mind.  Furthermore, as Lerner [2001] highlights, many varied factors 
influenced the initial allocation of patent policies, such the family in which the nation’s 
commercial legal system originated (consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny [1998]). 
 
  The results reported above continued to be robust when this instrumental variable 
was used.  Table 4 presents two representative regressions each from Tables 2 and 3, with 
the reform period dummy now used as an instrument for the protection-enhancing 
dummy.  The results discussed above continued to hold: for instance, the interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                             
detailed draft of the Uruguay Round agreement was released in December 1991 (Wegner 
[1993]).   27
between positive changes and strong protection was again significantly negative in the 





This paper examined the impact of changes in patent policy on innovation.   
Rather than analyzing a single case study, I studied 177 of the most significant shifts in 
patent policy across sixty countries and 150 years.  Adjusting for the change in overall 
patenting, the impact of patent protection-enhancing shifts on applications by residents 
was actually negative, whether filings in Great Britain or domestically were considered.  
The cross-sectional differences in the impact of these shifts were largely consistent with 
the predictions of economic theorists.  These findings are consistent with earlier case 
studies of individual policy changes. 
 
This analysis had two limitations, which suggest the need for further research.  
The first of these is to understand the interaction between patenting and other forms of 
technology policy.  As highlighted in papers by Kremer [1998], Shavell and van Ypersele 
[2001], and Wright [1983], in a number of historical instances nations have offered prizes 
or recognitions to discoverers of important inventions.  To what extent did these or other 
policy tools—such as trade secrecy and government subsidies and procurement—change 
at the same time as shifts in patent policy?  On a related note, did shifts in judicial 
doctrine mirror those in statutory protection, or serve to dampen their impact? 
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The second limitation relates to the crudeness of my measures of innovative 
output.  Due to the broad scope and long time frame of this analysis, I was required to use 
patent-based measures of innovation.  In an ideal world, I would have been able to 
examine a wide variety of measures, including R&D spending, total factor productivity 
growth, and counts of innovations.  Other effects might have also been identified had I 
examined changes over longer event windows, since some of the policy changes could 
have taken more than five years to impact innovation.  (Of course, the noisiness of the 
measures would have also increased substantially.)  Despite these caveats, the failure of 
domestic patenting to respond to enhancements of patent protection, and the particularly 
weak effects seen in developing nations, were quite striking.   29
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  Figure 1.  Number of changes in patent policy over time. The sample consists of the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 
1997, observed from 1850 (or the date of inception as an independent entity) to 1999.  The chart presents the number of policy reforms, as well as that of 

















































Policy Reforms   
Figure 2.  Patenting changes around the time of patent protection-enhancing policy changes.  The sample consists of 177 changes in patent policy 
between 1852 and 1998 in the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 1997.  The figure displays the change in the number of 
patent applications filed between five years before the event and five years after the event by domestic entities filing in the country undertaking the 
change, foreign entities filing in the country undertaking the change, and residents of the country undertaking the policy change in Great Britain.  
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Domestic Entities in Country
Foreign Entities in Country
Domestic Entities in Great Britain   
Figure 3.  Patenting changes around the time of patent protection-reducing or ambiguous policy changes.  The sample consists of 177 changes in patent 
policy between 1852 and 1998 in the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 1997.  The figure displays the change in the 
number of patent applications filed between five years before the event and five years after the event by domestic entities filing in the country 
undertaking the change, foreign entities filing in the country undertaking the change, and residents of the country undertaking the policy change in 
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Domestic Entities in Country
Foreign Entities in Country
Domestic Entities in Great Britain   
Table 1.  Impact of a change in patent policy on patenting activity. The sample consists of 177 changes in 
patent policy between 1852 and 1998 in 60 nations.  Panel A displays the change in the number of unadjusted 
patent applications filed from two years before the event to two years after the event by domestic entities 
residents of the country undertaking the policy change in Great Britain and in the country undertaking the 
change, and foreign entities filing in the country undertaking the change.  In Panels B and C, these changes 
are shown net of equal-weighted and value-weighted indexes of patenting in the ten nations with the longest 
time series of application data.  Underneath each adjusted change, the absolute t-statistic of the difference of 
the change from zero is displayed.  In all tests, each observation is weighted by the inverse of its standard 
deviation of the annual change in patenting from 20 to five years before the policy change. 
 
Panel A: Unadjusted Changes in Patenting Around Policy Changes 
  Residents’ Domestic  Entities  Foreign 
  Patenting in  Patenting  Patenting 
  United Kingdom  in Country  in Country 
Positive Patent Policy Changes   -27  +2424  +8662 
Ambiguous/Negative Changes  +210  +529  +1401 
Positive Changes Involving Coverage  -63  +2233  +9739 
Positive Changes Involving Duration  -80  +2399  +10957 
Positive Changes Involving Working Periods  -34  -1081  +3191 
Panel B: Changes in Patenting Around Policy Changes, Adjusted by Equal-Weighted Index 
  Residents’ Domestic  Entities  Foreign 
  Patenting in  Patenting  Patenting 
  United Kingdom  in Country  in Country 
Positive Patent Policy Changes   -101  -1617  +4979 
 ***[4.61]  *[1.86]  **[2.41] 
Ambiguous/Negative Changes  -217  -525  +390 
 ***[3.19]  [0.34]  [1.28] 
Positive Changes Involving Coverage  -98  +1915  +7704 
 ***[5.13]  [1.03]    **[2.58] 
Positive Changes Involving Duration  -190  -4714  +5699 
 ***[4.68]  **[2.22]  *[1.84] 
Positive Changes Involving Working Periods  -27  -1239  +2772 
    [1.33]  *[1.84]  [1.31] 
Panel C: Changes in Patenting Around Policy Changes, Adjusted by Value-Weighted Index 
  Residents’ Domestic  Entities  Foreign 
  Patenting in  Patenting  Patenting 
  United Kingdom  in Country  in Country 
Positive Patent Policy Changes   -100  -932  +5617 
 ***[4.52]  *[1.69]  ***[2.85] 
Ambiguous/Negative Changes  -137  -408  +501 
 **[2.40]  [0.07]  [1.65] 
Positive Changes Involving Coverage  -111  +1781  +7963 
 ***[5.12]  [0.94]  **[2.57] 
Positive Changes Involving Duration  -186  -3347  +6690 
 ***[4.63]  **[2.14]  **[2.36] 
Positive Changes Involving Working Periods  -27  -1289  +2809 
    [1.29]  *[1.89]  [1.27] 
 
* = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.    
Table 2.  Weighted least squares regression analyses of patenting in Great Britain by residents of the 
countries that underwent patent policy changes around the time of the changes. The sample consists of 177 
changes in patent policy between 1852 and 1998 in the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at 
the end of 1997.  The dependent variable is the change in the number of patent applications filed by residents 
of the country undertaking the policy change in Great Britain from two years prior to the policy change to 
two years afterwards, net of either of a value-weighted (VW) or equal-weighted (EW) index of patenting in 
the ten nations with the longest time series of application data.  The independent variables are dummy 
variables denoting whether the policy change entailed an unambiguous increase in protection and the aspects 
of patent policy that the change covered, variables denoting whether during the period the country began or 
ended a conflict on its territory or expanded or contracted its territory (with the former instance being coded 
as +1, the latter as –1, and all others as zero), the number of patent applications by domestic entities in Great 
Britain two years before the policy change, and the population of the nation at the time of the change.  In 
addition, the various regressions include dummy variables denoting whether the country had a particularly 
strong or weak patent policy before the change, the nation’s per capita gross domestic policy relative to the 
leading nation at the time, and the interaction of these measures with the dummy variable indicating an 
increase in patent protection.  Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
annual change in patent applications in Great Britain from twenty to five years before the policy change.  
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Change in U.K. Patent Applications Net of 
  VW Index  EW Index  VW Index  EW Index 
Positive Patent Policy Change?  165.94 [0.87]  ***598.53 [3.24]  19.13 [0.11]  -333.42 [0.88] 
Strong Protection Prior to Change?  -249.34 [0.96]  86.93 [0.35]     
Weak Protection Prior to Change?      273.22 [0.32]   
GDP as Percent of Leading Nation        ***-1561.76 [2.92] 
Strong Protection * Positive Change  **-602.57 [1.99]  ***-980.07 [3.34]     
Weak Protection * Positive Change      -133.66 [0.14]   
Relative GDP * Positive Change        **1292.27 [2.15] 
Change Involving Coverage?  50.74 [0.37]  216.92 [1.65]  32.63 [0.22]  61.80 [0.42] 
Change Involving Duration?  -199.37 [1.41]  -79.30 [0.58]  -171.04 [1.06]  -135.68 [0.91] 
Change Involving Cost?  ***1014.88 [4.42]  ***1137.36 [5.12]  ***1059.91 [4.24]  ***1252.63 [5.26] 
Change Involving Working Periods?  *-335.37 [1.78]  -192.88 [1.06]  -249.62 [1.22]  -117.16 [0.61] 
Inception of Conflict?  -10.97 [0.04]  -332.82 [1.09]  80.75 [0.24]  -118.82 [0.36] 
Change in Territory?  ***-1058.54 [3.37]  130.20 [0.43]  ***-1042.61 [3.03]  -118.22 [0.35] 
Applications Two Years before Event  ***-0.12 [11.63]  ***-0.13 [13.14]  ***-0.12 [10.13]  ***-0.12 [10.03] 
Population of Nation  0.07 [0.07]  0.27 [0.29]  -0.14 [0.14]  -0.96 [0.94] 
Constant  21.18 [0.09]  -523.10 [2.21]  -117.27 [0.50]  428.65 [1.10] 
        
Number of Observations  159  159  159  159 
F-Statistic 17.10  23.14  12.06  18.08 
p-Value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R
2 0.53  0.61  0.44  0.54 
 
* = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.    
Table 3.  Weighted least squares regression analyses of domestic patenting by residents of nations undergoing 
patent policy changes. The sample consists of 177 changes in patent policy between 1852 and 1998 in the sixty 
largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 1997.  The dependent variable is the change in the 
number of patent applications filed by domestic entities in the country undergoing the policy change from 
two years prior to the policy change to two years afterwards, net of either a value-weighted (VW) or equal-
weighted (EW) index of patenting in the ten nations with the longest time series of application data.  The 
independent variables are dummy variables denoting whether the policy change entailed an unambiguous 
increase in protection and the aspects of patent policy that the change covered, variables denoting whether 
during the period the country began or ended a conflict on its territory or expanded or contracted its 
territory (with the former instance being coded as +1, the latter as –1, and all others as zero), the number of 
patent applications by domestic entities two years before the policy change, and the population of the nation 
at the time of the change.  In addition, the various regressions include dummy variables denoting whether the 
country had a particularly strong or weak patent policy before the change, the nation’s per capita gross 
domestic policy relative to the leading nation at the time, and the interaction of these measures with the 
dummy variable indicating an increase in patent protection.  Each observation is weighted by the inverse of 
the standard deviation of the annual change in domestic patent applications from twenty to five years before 
the policy change.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Change in Domestic Patent Applications Net of 
  VW Index  EW Index  VW Index  EW Index 
Positive Patent Policy Change?  1862.87 [0.76]  2361.31 [0.82]  2727.11 [1.32]  2887.20 [0.59] 
Strong Protection Prior to Change?  -1079.46 [0.30]  -717.08 [0.17]     
Weak Protection Prior to Change?      -2018.17 [0.12]   
GDP as Percent of Leading Nation        4630.29 [0.63] 
Strong Protection * Positive Change  1657.97 [0.42]  1230.48 [0.27]     
Weak Protection * Positive Change      -611.87 [0.04]   
Relative GDP * Positive Change        -615.17 [0.08] 
Change Involving Coverage?  1153.91 [0.63]  1311.54 [0.61]  1423.43 [0.80]  1861.75 [0.88] 
Change Involving Duration?  -373.71 [0.21]  -566.56 [0.27]  -746.30 [0.41]  -387.44 [0.19] 
Change Involving Cost?  1979.52 [0.59]  1872.51 [0.48]  1580.56 [0.48]  1226.20 [0.32] 
Change Involving Working Periods?  1485.56 [0.53]  1620.48 [0.50]  1473.81 [0.53]  1758.43 [0.54] 
Inception of Conflict?  -1639.60 [0.41]  -1523.63 [0.33]  -1999.77 [0.51]  -2125.00 [0.46] 
Change in Territory?  -1231.93 [0.36]  -934.01 [0.23]  -1215.29 [0.35]  322.75 [0.08] 
Applications Two Years before Event  ***-0.23 [16.53]  ***-0.31 [18.95]  ***-0.24 [16.65]  ***-0.32 [18.64] 
Population of Nation  ***25.20 [3.05]  ***26.56 [2.74]  ***26.46 [3.22]  ***30.19 [2.94] 
Constant  -1449.71 [0.43]  -1500.72 [0.38]  -1756.58 [0.60]   -4797.64 [0.88] 
      
Number  of  Observations  132 132 132 132 
F-Statistic  27.83 36.82 28.05 37.29 
p-Value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R
2  0.69 0.75 0.69 0.75 
 
* = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level.    
Table 4.  Instrumental variable regression analyses of patenting in Great Britain and domestically by 
residents of nations undergoing patent policy changes.  The sample consists of 177 changes in patent policy 
between 1852 and 1998 in the sixty largest countries (by gross domestic product) at the end of 1997.  The 
dependent variable is the change in the number of patent applications filed in Great Britain and domestically 
by residents of the nation undergoing the policy change from two years prior to the policy change to two 
years afterwards, net of a equal-weighted index of patenting in the ten nations with the longest time series of 
application data.  The independent variables are dummy variables denoting whether the policy change 
entailed an unambiguous increase in protection and the aspects of patent policy that the change covered, 
variables denoting whether during the period the country began or ended a conflict on its territory or 
expanded or contracted its territory (with the former instance being coded as +1, the latter as –1, and all 
others as zero), the number of patent applications by domestic entities in Great Britain and domestically two 
years before the policy change, and the population of the nation at the time of the change.  In addition, the 
various regressions include dummy variables denoting whether the country had a particularly strong patent 
policy before the change, the nation’s per capita gross domestic policy relative to the leading nation at the 
time, and the interaction of these measures with the dummy variable indicating an increase in patent 
protection.  A dummy variable denoting that the policy change took place in the ten years following the 
signing of the Paris Convention of 1883 and the preliminary version of the TRIPs agreement of 1993 is used 
as instrument for the measure of positive patent policy changes.  Each observation is weighted by the inverse 
of the standard deviation of the annual change in patent applications in Great Britain and domestically from 
twenty to five years before the policy change.  Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Change in Patent Applications, Net of Equal-Weighted Index  
  Applications in Great Britain  Domestic Applications 
Positive Patent Policy Change?  ***7737.47 [3.00]  -3342.62 [0.87]   -7243.45 [0.37]  6075.96 [0.19] 
Strong Protection Prior to Change?  **4546.50 [2.28]    -3062.68 [0.16]   
GDP as Percent of Leading Nation    **-9152.71 [2.48]     15135.62 [0.57] 
Strong Protection * Positive Change  **-6671.86 [2.48]    1621.90 [0.07]   
Relative GDP * Positive Change    **10667.92 [2.06]     -18925.80 [0.49] 
Change Involving Coverage?  **1137.27 [2.15]  -115.15 [0.31]   202.25 [0.07]  1569.60 [0.56] 
Change Involving Duration?  133.54 [0.29]  -529.23 [1.50]   -1912.28 [0.86]  -926.64 [0.39] 
Change Involving Cost?  **2655.75 [2.12]  **2128.94 [2.56]   -2480.94 [0.44]  -1792.07 [0.28] 
Change Involving Working Periods?  **3322.78 [2.26]  1438.40 [1.57]   -5693.91 [0.58]  -4964.26 [0.77] 
Inception of Conflict?  *-2221.32 [1.79]  -202.12 [0.23]   -104.44 [0.02]  -627.54 [0.11] 
Change in Territory?  -1380.91 [1.17]  **-2111.38 [2.14]   1875.57 [0.29]  4339.82 [0.66] 
Applications Two Years before Event  -0.12 [3.52]  ***-0.08 [2.79]   ***-0.24 [9.49]  ***-0.24 [9.84] 
Population of Nation  3.45 [1.08]  -4.12 [1.55]   22.52 [1.41]  30.62 [1.64] 
Constant ***-7283.29 
[2.94] 
2883.99 [1.01]   8720.00 [0.47]  -3886.16 [0.16] 
        
Number of Observations  159  159   132  132 
F-Statistic 3.08  5.34   11.29  11.34 
p-Value 0.001  0.000   0.000  0.000 
 
 * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% level; *** = significant at the 1% level. 